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Abstract 
 
This paper makes the case that productivity is Canada’s economic destiny and that 
Canada’s dismal productivity performance, both from a historical and international 
perspective, therefore represents our biggest economic challenge. It then puts forward 
three specific policies to improve Canada’s productivity performance: foster the diffusion 
of best-practice technologies; remove the provincial sales tax on purchases of machinery 
and equipment; and promote interprovincial movement of workers by improving labour 
market information, removing professional barriers to labour mobility, and establishing a 
tax credit for interprovincial job search. It finds that the short-term costs of these policies 





Ce rapport d￩fend l’id￩e selon laquelle la destinée économique du Canada repose sur la 
croissance de son niveau de productivit￩ et qu’￩tant donn￩e sa pi￨tre performance à ce 
niveau au plan historique et international, une croissance accrue de la productivité 
représente le plus grand défi économique de la nation. Le rapport propose trois politiques 
spécifiques pour améliorer la performance du Canada sur le plan de la productivité : 
stimuler la diffusion de technologies plus avancées; éliminer les taxes de ventes 
provinciales sur les achats de machines et de matériels; et promouvoir le déplacement des 
travailleurs entre les provinces en am￩liorant l’information sur le march￩ de travail, en 
￩liminant les barri￨res au mouvement de la main d’œuvre li￩es aux certifications et en 
introduisant un cr￩dit d’impôt pour la recherche d’emploi dans les autres provinces. Le 
rapport conclut que les bénéfices à long terme associées à ces politiques surpasseraient 
facilement les coûts à court-terme liées à leur implantation.        
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Executive Summary 
 
Since 2000, labour productivity growth in the Canadian economy has been weak. 
Yet increased productivity growth is by far the most important determinant or driver of 
increased material living standards for Canadians. It is also the most important means by 
which any fiscal pressures arising from the demographic challenges associated with an 
aging population can be met.  The objective of this paper is to put forward three concrete 
policy proposals to improve the productivity performance of the Canadian economy.  
 
Context for the Productivity Debate in Canada 
 
Economic growth can be decomposed into labour input growth, measured by 
hours worked, and labour productivity growth, defined as output per worker. With the 
ageing of the baby boom cohorts and their retirement from the workforce, labour force 
growth in Canada will fall significantly. This means that the importance of hours worked 
as a source of economic growth will fall in the future. Productivity growth will hence 
assume a greater relative importance as a source of economic growth. In the future, if 
Canada wants to increase GDP, it will have to increase labour productivity. 
 
Since 2000, Canada’s labour productivity performance has deteriorated relative to 
our performance during the second half of the 1990s. Canada’s productivity growth has 
also been very weak relative to that experienced in the United States and in other OECD 
countries. In fact, Canada’s productivity growth rate is sub-par and we are falling further 
and further behind other OECD countries. In this context, reviving productivity growth is 
indeed the biggest and most important economic challenge facing this country.  
 
Capital investment, human capital, and technological change can be considered 
the proximate sources of labour productivity growth, but they themselves cannot explain 
why productivity growth actually takes place. Rather, it is the decisions of business to 
invest and innovate and of workers to acquire human capital which are the driving force 
behind business sector productivity advance. These decisions are affected by many 
factors such as the state of business confidence, the entrepreneurial spirit of the business 
class, and government policies. The latter are the focus of this paper.   
 
Why Productivity is a Tough Sell 
 
There is an elite consensus in Canada that productivity is very important, but few 
governments or political parties directly address or talk about the productivity issue. This 
behaviour in a way is understandable because politicians know that productivity does not 
poll well or resonate as an issue for Canadians.  
 
People associate productivity increases with working longer hours. Many also 
fear that higher productivity at the industry or firm level translates into layoffs. This can 
be true in an industry or firm characterized by strong productivity gains and limited 
potential for increases in demand for output. But at the total economy level, there is no 
long-run negative relationship between productivity and employment. Productivity   5 
growth increases potential real income, which in turn increases demand, resulting in 
employment opportunities in new industries. There is therefore no reason why 
productivity growth should have negative long-run consequences for total employment. 
 
Given that Canadians have already achieved a high standard of living relative to 
other countries, some feel that productivity gains may be less important than they once 
were. Yet, productivity does lead to greater income which can in principle be used to 
raise economic well-being. More importantly, many measures that can be taken to foster 
productivity are related to changes in policy regimes and the government costs associated 
with such policies are minimal. Any free lunches that can be obtained through more 
intelligent public policy should be sought. 
 
Productivity growth is of course associated with economic growth and economic 
growth is often associated with environmental degradation and climate change. Yet, rich 
countries are better positioned to take the steps needed to preserve the environment than 
poor countries. Productivity growth, which transforms poor countries into rich countries, 
can therefore potentially be more a part of the solution to environmental degradation than 
a cause of this degradation.  
 
Strong productivity growth is key to the financing of higher health and pension 
costs associated with the growing proportion of the population 65 and over. The message 
that Canadians must hear is that productivity growth is vital to their economic destiny.  
 
Policies to Improve Productivity in Canada 
 
1. More Rapid Diffusion and Adoption of Best Practice Technologies  
 
Technological progress is the most important determinant of productivity 
advance. At any given time, only a small number of firms or countries are on the 
technological frontier, defined at the set of technologies that are the most advanced, 
efficient, and cost effective. Other firms or countries can experience very rapid 
productivity growth by adopting these best practice technologies and moving toward the 
technological frontier. 
 
The federal government and provincial governments in Canada devote significant 
resources to subsiding the research and development (R&D) activities of the private 
sector. Indeed, the federal scientific research and experimental development tax credit in 
2007 is projected to cost $2,675 million. To be sure, R&D is important for innovation, 
particular in certain high tech sectors such as communications equipment and 
aeronautics, and governments must contribute to support R&D activities. But in 2002, 
less than 1 per cent of firms performed R&D in Canada. If the term “innovation” were 
reserved for these, very few Canadian firms would be considered innovative.  
 
However, an innovative firm is more appropriately defined as one which 
introduces new production processes and products. By this criterion, 81 per cent of 
manufacturing firms in Canada can be considered innovative according to the 1999   6 
Survey of Innovation. From the point of view of fostering productivity growth, what is 
relevant is the adoption of best practice technologies. Yet this path to productivity 
improvement receives much less attention than R&D.  
 
A case can thus be made that there should be a rebalancing of the relative efforts 
that governments in Canada devote to support for private sector R&D activities versus 
the support given for the adoption of best practice technologies. To foster technological 
innovation and productivity growth, it is proposed that additional resources be allocated 
to programs that assist SMEs in the identification and adoption/adaptation of new 
technologies. The National Research Council’s Industrial Research Assistance Program 
(NRC-IRAP) is an example of a successful technology transfer program. Productivity 
advance in Canada can be fostered in a cost effective manner through expansion of 
existing technology transfer programs such as IRAP, and the creation of new programs 
with similar objectives. Specific initiatives to develop these types of program merit 
serious attention as a means to improve productivity.  
 
Removal of the Provincial Sales Tax on Purchases of Machinery and Equipment 
 
It has long been recognized that investment in machinery and equipment (M&E) 
is a key driver of productivity growth. M&E investment has historically been weak in 
Canada relative to other OECD countries. One reason for lower M&E investment in 
Canada may be the higher cost of capital in Canada, as proxied by the marginal effective 
tax rate (METR) on capital. In 2006, the METR was 36.6 per cent in Canada, sixth out of 
45 countries.  
 
A key reason why our METR is so high is because five provinces (Ontario, 
British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) apply their retail 
or provincial sales tax (PST) to the purchase of capital goods such as machinery and 
equipment, including ICT goods. Tax policy experts across the political spectrum are 
unanimous that the current PST regime which taxes the purchase of new capital 
equipment is extremely bad policy, perhaps unique in its incompetence among developed 
countries.  
 
The federal government has long recognized the problems associated with the 
PST on capital goods. A possible resolution to this situation lies in the federal 
government providing financial assistance to the PST provinces to harmonize their PST 
with the GST. Such assistance was offered to the three Atlantic provinces in the early 
1990s to encourage harmonization. This is the ideal time for such an initiative given the 
sound fiscal situation of the federal government. 
 
Promotion of the Geographical Migration of Workers 
 
In addition to the three fundamental drivers, the reallocation of factors of 
production from low productivity level uses to high productivity level uses contributes 
significantly to aggregate productivity growth. This reallocation can take place between 
firms, across industries, across occupations, and across space.   7 
 
Using two very crude methodologies, this paper presents two estimates of the 
output and productivity gains arising from interprovincial migration in Canada. The first 
methodology uses the impact of interprovincial migration on earnings to estimate the 
gains from migration. The gains in 2006 are estimated at about $413 million in labour 
income and $779 million in GDP, the latter equivalent to 0.05 per cent of GDP. The 
second methodology uses inter-provincial labour productivity differences. In 2006, the 
estimated total change in nominal output as a result of interprovincial migration was 
$1,966.4 million, equivalent to 0.137 per cent of GDP. About 70 per cent of the gains 
were from the reallocation of workers and 30 per cent from employment increases. 
 
The gains to aggregate productivity from interprovincial migration based on the 
methodologies discussed above are not huge, although they are likely underestimated for 
a number of reasons. Importantly, however, the estimated annual output gains from 
migration are positive and cumulate over time. Migration should be recognized as a 
contributor to aggregate productivity growth.   
 
One concrete suggestion to increase labour mobility would be the creation of an 
independent agency for the development and dissemination of LMI along the lines of the 
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI). Both federal and provincial 
government play a role in the LMI area, but their efforts are often uncoordinated and 
duplicative. A non-governmental agency funded by both levels of government could 
potentially invigorate the LMI field and make Canadians more aware of employment 
opportunities throughout the country.  
 
In terms of new policies to foster interprovincial mobility, this paper also 
proposes that the federal government establish a tax credit for expenses associated with 
job search in other provinces. Moving expenses are currently deductible from income. 
But the expenses associated with initial job search, such as travel and accommodation 
expenses, are currently not covered. Their coverage would reduce the after-tax cost of 
interprovincial job search and hence provide an additional fiscal incentive for workers to 
seek better employment opportunities in other provinces. The actual costs of such a 
program would be small. A ballpark estimate of the cost of the initiative might be in the 




This paper has made the case that productivity is our economic destiny and that 
Canada’s dismal productivity performance, both from a historical and international 
perspective, therefore represents our biggest economic challenge. It then put forward 
three specific policies to improve Canada’s productivity performance: foster the diffusion 
of best-practice technologies; remove the provincial sales tax on purchases of machinery 
and equipment; and promote interprovincial movement of workers by improving labour 
market information, removing professional barriers to labour mobility, and establishing a 
tax credit for interprovincial job search. The short-term costs of these policies would be 
greatly outweighed by the long-term benefits.  8 
 






  Since 2000, labour productivity growth in the Canadian economy has been weak. 
Yet increased productivity growth is by far the most important determinant or driver of 
increased material living standards for Canadians. It is also the most important means by 
which any fiscal pressures arising from the demographic challenges associated with an 
aging population can be met. From this perspective, lagging productivity growth 
represents a serious economic problem facing the country that must be addressed if future 
living standards of Canadians are to be maintained and continue to progress (Lynch, 
2006). 
 
  The objective of this paper is to put forward three concrete policy proposals to 
improve the productivity performance of the Canadian economy. The paper is divided 
into three main sections. The first part discusses the context of the productivity debate. 
The second section examines the optics of productivity policy in this country. The third 
section, the most important, puts forward three policy proposals to improve productivity, 
namely: foster the diffusion of best-practice technologies; remove provincial sales taxes 
on purchases of machinery and equipment; and promote interprovincial movement of 
workers by improving labour market information, removing professional barriers to 
labour mobility, and establishing a tax credit for interprovincial job search. 
 
                                                 
1 This report is an unabridged version of a paper published in J. Leonard, C. Ragan and F. St-Hilaire (eds.), 
A Canadian Priorities Agenda: Policy Choices to Improve Economic and Social Well-Being, (Montreal: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy), November 2007, pp. 353-388. The author would like to thank 
Chris Ragan for the invitation to prepare this paper for the Canadian Priorities Agenda project. The author 
would also like to thank project organizers Chris Ragan, France St-Hilaire and Jeremy Leonard and 
discussants Don Drummond and Rick Harris for their very useful comments. Finally, the author would like 
to thank John Lester from Finance Canada, Robert Reichert from the National Research Council and Jean-
François Arsenault and Sharon Qiao from the Centre for the Study of Living Standards for assistance.    9 
 
I. The Context for the Productivity Debate in Canada  
 
  In order to engage in productive and meaningful debate on what policies would be 
most effective in raising productivity levels in Canada, it is necessary to have at least a 
rudimentary understanding of the productivity issue. This part of the paper provides 
context for the productivity policy debate by briefly discussing definitions of productivity 
measures and concepts; the relationship between productivity, material living standards, 
and well-being; productivity measurement problems; the main drivers of productivity 
growth, and Canada’s recent productivity performance. 
 
A. Basic Productivity Definitions and Concepts  
 
  This paper focuses on policies to improve productivity performance, not technical 
productivity issues. Nevertheless, it is important that the reader have a basic 
understanding of the concept of productivity.
2 Productivity of course is the ratio of output 
to an input or inputs. A partial productivity measure is when output (either value added or 
gross output) is divided by a single input. The best known partial productivity measure, 
and the focus of this paper, is the ratio of output to labour input or labour productivity. 
Other partial productivity measures are capital productivity, energy productivity (or 
intensity), and materials productivity. A total factor or multifactor productivity measure 
(TFP or MFP) is the ratio of output to two or more inputs which are combined into a 
composite input index. TFP measures are most often based on capital and labour as 
inputs, but also include energy, materials and services (KLEMS estimates).  
 
  From the point of view of the advance of living standards and warranted real 
wage growth, labour productivity is key. This is because real income can be only 
increased in the long run if more real output is produced. In contrast, total factor 
productivity is more a measure of the efficiency in which inputs are used. While an 
important topic, it is much less related to real income growth than labour productivity. 
TFP growth will not be discussed in this paper. All references to productivity in the paper 
hence refer to labour productivity.
3  
 
                                                 
2 For more extensive discussions of productivity concepts and issues, see Sharpe (1998), Rao and Sharpe 
(2002), Sharpe (2002),  as well as articles published in the International Productivity Monitor 
(www.csls.ca/ipm). 
 
3 The two productivity measures can give different signals. For example, on July 15, 2005, Statistics 
Canada released estimates showing that multifactor productivity growth in Canada since 2000 was twice 
the rate of the 1990s. This development reflects the fall in the rate of growth of capital input, which is 
actually positive from the point of view of multifactor productivity. Yet Statistics Canada had earlier 
reported that labour productivity growth since 2000 was much worse than in the 1990s. The media ignored 
the report on multifactor productivity. This was fortunate as reporting improved multifactor productivity 
would have confused the public as to whether Canada is experiencing a productivity problem, which I 
believe it is. 
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    The term productivity can refer to both the level of productivity and the 
productivity growth rate, that is the per cent change in levels. Productivity growth rates, 
which are the focus of attention of economists, must be based in constant price measures 
of output and productivity that take account of price increases in the value of output in 
order to capture increases in the physical or real amount of output produced per hour 
worked.  On the other hand, productivity levels, which are of particular interest to 
business analysts, are expressed in current price terms and reflect the current structure of 
relative prices.
4 Productivity growth rates and trends in current price productivity levels 
may in fact move in opposite directions. For example, increased oil prices have raised the 
current dollar value of output per hour produced by the oil and gas industry, but may 
actually lower productivity growth as more marginal deposits requiring more labour input 
per barrel of oil become profitable and are exploited.  
 
B. Contribution of Productivity to Economic Growth, Living Standards, and Well-
being 
 
















Chart 1: Contribution of Labour Productivity to Economic (GDP) 
Growth in Canada 
Per cent
Source: Table 2.  
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note that industries with high productivity growth rates are not necessarily the ones with 
high productivity levels just as industries with low productivity growth rate do not necessarily have low 
productivity levels. This is because of changes in relative prices. Ironically, the sector that currently has the 
lowest current dollar value added per hour worked in the economy is agriculture. Yet this is the industry 
with the fastest labour productivity growth over the last half century! What has happened is that through 
competition, the robust productivity gains in agriculture have been passed on to consumers in the form of 
lower food prices, not to the producers in the form of higher wages and returns to capital.  
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Economic growth, defined as real GDP growth or real output growth, can be 
decomposed into labour input growth measured by hours worked and labour productivity 
growth, defined as output per worker. Summary Table 1 and Chart 1 show that 
productivity growth accounted for 63 per cent of economic growth over the 1947-2006 
period. The contribution from labour productivity was larger in the 1947-73 period than 
from 1973 to 2006 (77 per cent versus 45 per cent).   
 
Summary Table 1: The Relationship Between GDP and Productivity in 
Canada, 1947-2006 
  
GDP  Total Hours 
Worked for All Jobs 
Labour Productivity 
(GDP per Hour) 
Levels 
1 
   A=B*C  B  C 
1947  $132,799   13,063  10.17 
1973  457,766  17,349  26.39 
2006  1,191,073  29,054  41.00 
2026 
*  1,705,965  30,897  55.21 
Compound average annual growth rates 
   A≈B+C  B  C 
1947-2006  3.79  1.36  2.39 
1947-1973  4.87  1.10  3.74 
1973-2006  2.71  1.48  1.22 
2006-2026  1.81  0.31  1.50 
Relative contribution to the growth rate of GDP per capital  
1947-2006  100  36.0  63.1 
1947-1973  100  22.5  76.6 
1973-2006  100  54.4  44.9 
2006-2026  100  17.0  82.8 
Notes:  
1. From 2006-2026, labour productivity is assumed to grow at 1.5 per cent per year; average hours worked per 
week are held at the 2006 level; employment is assumed to grow at the same rate as that of the labour force; and 
labour force growth is based on projected 15-64 years old population growth with 2006 labour force 
participation rate for the 15-64 age group held constant. 
2. Numbers might not add up to 100 due to rounding 
Source: Table 1 
 
The size of the working age population (15 to 64) is the primary driver of trends 
in hours of potential labour supply, which is in turn determined by employment trends. In 
theory, declines in the unemployment rate, higher labour force participation rates, and 
increases in average annual hours worked could offset the decline in the size of the 
working age population. But the magnitude of any changes from these sources are too 
small to offset demographic developments.   
 
Consequently, with the ageing of the baby boom cohorts and their retirement from 
the workforce, which will start in a few years, labour force growth in Canada will fall 
significantly (Chart 2). Net labour force growth will turn negative around 2023.
5 This 
                                                 
5 Immigrants will account for a large proportion of the new entrants into the labour force.   12 
means that the importance of hours worked as a source of economic growth will fall in 
the future. Productivity growth will hence assume a greater relative importance as a 
source of economic growth. It is estimated that from 2006 to 2026 productivity growth 
will account for 83 per cent of economic growth as employment growth is expected to be 
only 0.3 per cent per year over the period. Once employment growth disappears around 
2023, economic growth will in effect become synonymous with labour productivity 











Chart 2: Net Labour Force Growth in Canada, 1977-2026
Source: Labour force estimates for 1976-2006 from Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey; for 2007-2026 from Statistics 
Canada, Population Estimates and Projections.
Note: Projected labour force estimates are calculated by multiplying projected population with the 2006 labour force participation rates.
Thousands
Actual data  (1977-2006) Projections (2007-2026)
 
 
2) Productivity and GDP per capita   
 
Gross Domestic Product per capita, the most widely used measure of living 
standards, can be decomposed into the product of labour productivity (defined as output 
per hour worked at the total economy level), the average number of hours each employed 
person works, and the proportion of the entire population that is employed.
6 Likewise, the 
growth rate of real income as proxied by the GDP per capita growth rate can be 
approximately decomposed into the summation of the growth rates of these three 
variables. 
 
Summary Table 2 demonstrates this decomposition using Canadian data for the 
1947-2006 period and sub-periods. It provides estimates of the levels and growth rates of 
                                                 
6 Changes in terms of trade can also contribute to changes in real income. There were particularly important 
for Canada in the 2002-2005 period, but their contribution over long periods is small (Kohli, 2006). The 
decomposition of GDP per capita in the text ignores the role of terms of trade effects.    13 
GDP per capita, labour productivity, average hours worked per week, and the 
employment /total population ratio as well as the contribution of these latter three factors 
to GDP per capita growth.  
 
Summary Table 2: The Relationship Between Real Income and Productivity in Canada, 
1947-2006 
  
GDP per Capita  Labour Productivity 
(Output per Hour) 
Average Hours 





   A=B*(C*52)*(D/100)  B  C  D 
1947  $10,586   10.17  50.50  39.60 
1973  20,387  26.39  37.00  40.10 
2006  36,557  41.00  33.90  50.60 
2026 
2  45,040  55.21  33.90  46.30 
Compound average annual growth rates 
   A≈B+C+D  B  C  D 
1947-2006  2.12  2.39  -0.68  0.42 
1947-1973  2.55  3.74  -1.19  0.05 
1973-2006  1.79  1.34  -0.27  0.70 
2006-2026  1.05  1.50  0.00  -0.45 
Relative contribution to the growth rate of GDP per capital  
1947-2006  100  112.70  -31.80  19.60 
1947-1973  100  146.40  -46.60  1.90 
1973-2006  100  81.80  -18.00  36.00 
2006-2026  100  143.00  0.00  -42.40 
 
Notes:  
1. GDP per capita and labour productivity are expressed in 1997 chained dollars.  Hours are expressed as hours per week.  The 
employment-population ratio is expressed in per cent.  
2. From 2006-2026, labour productivity is assumed to grow at 1.5 per cent per year; average hours worked per week are held at the 
2006 level; employment is assumed to grow at the same rate as that of the labour force; and labour force growth is based on projected 
15-64 years old population growth with 2006 labour force participation rate for the 15-64 age group held constant. 
3. Numbers might not add up to 100 due to rounding 
Source: Table 2 
 
Over the 1947-2006 period, GDP per capita grew by 2.12 per cent per year on 
average. This was driven entirely by productivity growth, at 2.39 per cent per year.  In 
other words, productivity growth accounted for all the increase in living standards (113 
per cent).
7 Over the 1947-73 period very strong productivity growth meant that 
productivity accounted for 146 per cent of living standards growth. Slower productivity 
growth after 1973 reduced the contribution of productivity to GDP per capita growth to 
82 per cent.  
 
  In absolute terms growth in GDP per capita in Canada fell from a 2.55 average 
annual rate of increase in the 1947-1973 period to 1.79 per cent in the 1973-2006 period. 
                                                 
7 The employment-population ratio grew modestly over this period on an annual per cent basis, making a 
small contribution to GDP per capita growth.  Average hours of work, on the other hand, declined from 51 
hours per week in 1947 to less than 35 hours per week in 2004, representing a serious drag on GDP per 
capita growth.  
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The 2.4 percentage point slowdown in labour productivity growth between these periods 
more than accounted for the decline in income per capita growth.
8   
 
  Demographic developments will mean that in the future productivity gains will be 
more important as a source of advances in living standards than they were in the 1973-
2006 period. Over the 2006-2026 period, the rapid growth of the population aged 65 and 
over will cause the employment-population ratio to fall, putting downward pressure on 
growth in material living standards. With no expected increase in average weekly hours, 
productivity will be responsible for 143 per cent of future living standards growth. 
  
3) Productivity and Economic Well-being 
 
  In addition to its positive effect on living standards, productivity growth has a 
salutary effect on the broader concepts of economic and social well-being. Osberg and 
Sharpe (2001 and 2002) develop a measure of economic well-being that includes 
consumption flows, stocks of wealth, equality, and economic security. Sharpe (2002) 
shows that through various mechanisms, productivity growth can lead to improvements 
in all these dimensions of economic well-being.
9   
 
C. Productivity Measurement Problems  
 
  The estimation of productivity growth is fraught with measurement problems and 
it is de rigueur in papers on productivity issues to make reference to this reality. Because 
of these measurement problems, there can be significant margin of error associated with 
productivity growth estimates and these estimates can be subject to large revisions. While 
these issues are not of direct relevance to policies to improve productivity growth, the 
reader should be aware of them. 
 
  The most serious measurement problem in productivity statistics is the lack of 
direct measures of output for most of the public sector. Inputs such as employment are 
often used as a proxy for output in these cases, so measures of labour productivity growth 
are by definition zero. To the degree that there in fact have been productivity gains in the 
public sector, the output and productivity performance of this sector, and hence of the 
total economy, will have been underestimated by the official statistics.  
 
  The second most important measurement issue facing those who compile 
productivity statistics is whether the quality changes of existing goods and the 
introduction of new goods are adequately captured by price indexes. These indexes are of 
course crucial to deflate nominal output to obtain estimates of real output and hence 
productivity.  To the degree that price indexes have not been adequately capturing quality 
improvement, real output and hence real productivity growth will have been 
underestimated. 
                                                 
8 The negative impact of the much slower productivity growth on GDP per capita was partly offset by the 
increased employment rate. 
9 Also see the volume edited by Sharpe, St-Hilaire and Banting (2002) for papers on the two-way 
relationship between productivity and  social variables.   15 
 
D. Productivity Drivers 
 
  In order to develop policies to improve productivity performance, it is important 
to first identify the drivers of productivity growth.
10 The standard starting point for the 
discussion of the dynamics of productivity growth is the simple neo-classical growth 
accounting model. In this model, there are three key factors determining labour 
productivity growth. The first is investment in capital goods, which determines the size of 
the capital stock and hence that amount of machinery and equipment and structures 
available to each worker. Higher ratios of capital to labour, or capital intensity, boost 
labour productivity. The second is investment in human resources, which determines the 
quality of labour input. More human capital makes a worker more productive. The third 
is the pace of technological progress, which is very roughly proxied by the rate of total 
factor productivity growth. Technological progress is affected by the development of new 
knowledge through R&D.  
 
  Capital investment, human capital, and technological change can be considered 
the proximate sources of labour productivity growth, but they themselves cannot explain 
why productivity growth actually takes place. Rather, it is the decisions of business to 
invest and innovate and of workers to acquire human capital which are the driving force 
behind business sector productivity advance. These decisions are affected by many 
factors such as the state of business confidence, the entrepreneurial spirit of the business 
class, and government policies. The latter are the focus of this paper.   
 
Government policies affect the environment in which business operates in myriad 
ways. The existence or absence of the rule of law is an obvious example, although of 
more relevance to developing countries than developed countries. Macroeconomic 
policies that affect the business environment include monetary policy, fiscal policy, tax 
policy, trade policy, among others. Policies of a more micro-economic nature that affect 
the business environment include competition policy, regulatory policies, and intellectual 
property protection. 
 
  The magnitude of the impact of government policies on business sector 
productivity growth is very difficult to gauge. There is no doubt that through bad policy 
government can have a very detrimental effect on economic and productivity growth. 
Stagnant countries rife with corruption and lacking appropriate governance structures 
testify to the ability of government to kill the economy. Developments in Zimbabwze 
drive home this point. Thankfully, such a situation is not relevant to a developed country 
such as Canada with its democratic traditions, strong rule of law, and professional public 
service.  
 
  Long-run business sector productivity growth in Canada is primarily driven by the 
pace of technological change, supported by human resource development. Technological 
change may be either embodied, what is embedded and hence put into use through new 
capital equipment, or disembodied, that is not embodied in new equipment, such as 
                                                 
10 See Harris (2002) for a more comprehensive discussion of the drivers of productivity growth.   16 
organizational change. Government policies in this country currently do not represent a 
major impediment to or constraint on business investment, innovation and human capital 
formation, and hence on productivity growth. It is extremely unlikely that Canada’s 
potential labour productivity growth is double its current trend productivity growth 
(estimated to be around 1.5 per cent per year by the Bank of Canada (2006)). In other 
words, in a world where Canadian governments institute the policies most conducive to 
productivity growth, it is very unlikely that long-run productivity growth could double.       
 
  This does not mean that there is no potential for productivity improvement 
through better public policies. Indeed, this is the premise of the paper. But one must be 
realistic about the potential for improvement. In my view, a reasonable ballpark upper 
bound estimate of the impact of better public policy on labour productivity growth in the 
medium term might be 0.5 percentage points increase per year. Of course, trend labour 
productivity growth could potentially pick up by much more than 0.5 points due to non-
public policy related factors such as more rapid technological progress and faster capital 
accumulation. Indeed, few if any economists argue that the large acceleration of labour 
productivity growth in the United States since 1995 has been primarily driven by 
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Chart 3: Provincial GDP per Worker as a Proportion of the National 
Average, 2005 per cent
Source:  Statistics Canada Provincial Economic Accounts and Labour Force Survey.
 
 
This impact of better public policy on productivity may seem small, but given the 
size of the economy, in absolute terms it is huge. In 2006, the nominal value of GDP in 
Canada was around $1.4 trillion or $1,400 billion. An increase in productivity and hence 
nominal GDP of 0.5 per cent would amount to $7 billion per year. This is massive. Public   17 
policy that could effectuate such an increase in wealth should be strongly encouraged and 
funded.  
 
  Two additional factors also influence productivity growth and levels. The first is 
the reallocation of labour and capital across the sectors of the economy. As a general rule, 
workers leave firms, industries, sectors, and regions characterized by below average 
productivity levels and enter those characterized by above average levels. This produces 
a bonus to aggregate productivity growth above the contribution from within sector 
productivity gains. The best known historical example of this source of aggregate 
productivity growth was the movement of workers out of low productivity agriculture in 
the decades following WWII.   
 
  The other factor affecting productivity relates to the natural resource sector. The 
discovery and exploitation of new natural resources deposits can spur productivity 
growth through composition effects as average productivity of natural resources 
industries is generally much above the industrial aggregate. Since 2000, the development 
of diamond mines in the Northwest Territories and the offshore oil deposits in 
Newfoundland has resulted in these two jurisdictions having the two fastest rates of 
productivity growth of any jurisdictions in the country. Higher natural resource prices 
also increase the relative productivity levels, expressed in current dollars, of resource rich 
provinces. Higher energy prices raised Alberta’s nominal GDP per worker from 111 per 
cent in 1999 to 144 per cent of the national average in 2005 (Chart 3)  
   
E. Productivity Trends 
 
  The Canadian economy has performed well on almost all indicators in recent 
years. Output and employment growth have been strong, inflation and unemployment are 
low, the federal government deficit has long been eliminated, public debt is falling in 
both absolute terms and relative to GDP, and the Canadian dollar has appreciated. As the 
OECD remarks in its 2006 country report on Canada (OECD, 2006:9) “The Canadian 
economy has continued to deliver excellent results in nearly all respects.” A recent IMF 
report on Canada (IMF, 2007) reached a similar conclusion.  
 
  The one area where Canada has performed poorly, from both an historical and 
international perspective, is productivity growth. Ironically, as discussed above, 
productivity growth is of paramount importance to future living standards. Not 
surprisingly, both the OECD and IMF reports highlight this area of weakness and 
recommend policies to rectify it.
11 
 
Since 2000, Canada’s labour productivity performance has deteriorated relative to our 
performance during the second half of the 1990s. Business sector output per hour 
advanced at only a 1.0 per cent average annual rate in Canada between 2000 and 2006, 
only about one third the annual rate of advance of 2.9 per cent recorded in Canada 
                                                 
11  The OECD country report (2006:10) says that a challenge for all levels of government is to raise 
productivity and that boosting productivity growth depends on improving the overall business environment. 
For an OECD perspective on Canada, also see Cotis (2006).   18 
between 1996 and 2000 (Chart 4). Total economy productivity growth exhibited an 
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Chart 4: Business Sector Output per Hour Growth in Canada and the 
United States (average annual rates and annual rates of change, per cent)
Sources: GDP in chained dollars and total hours worked from the Productivity and Costs Program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the 
United States, and annual averages of quarterly estimates from the Productivity Program Database of Statistics Canada for Canada.       




Canada’s productivity growth has also been very weak relative to that experienced in 
the United States. Since 2000 our business sector output per hour growth rate has been 
only one third the annual rate of increase of 2.9 per cent recorded south of the border 
(Chart 4). Based on Industry Canada benchmark labour productivity level estimates (Rao, 
Tang and Wang, 2004), Canada’s lagging labour productivity growth has resulted in the 
widening of the business sector labour productivity gap from 17 percentage points in 




From an OECD perspective, Canada’s relative productivity performance has been 
very weak. Over the 1973-2006 period, output per hour in Canada advanced at only a 1.2 
per cent average annual  rate (Chart 6), down from 3.0 per cent in the 1950-73 period, a 
drop of nearly two thirds. Since 1973 Canada has had the third lowest rate of growth in 
output per hour among 23 OECD countries, with only New Zealand and Switzerland 
doing worse (Summary Table 3 and Chart 7). This resulted in Canada’s level of output 
per hour falling from third highest in the OECD in 1950 and in 1973 to 16
th in 2006 
(Chart 8).  
 
                                                 
12 The Canada-US labour productivity gap at the total economy level is less than at the business sector level 
(Baldwin et al., 2005). On the issue of Canada-US productivity level and hours worked comparisons, also 













Chart 5: Output per Hour in the Business Sector in Canada as a 
percentage of the U.S. level, 1947-2006
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Chart 6: Canada's Output per Hour Average Annual Growth Rate
per cent
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, June 2007, http://www.ggdc.net.   
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Summary Table 3: Output per Hour Levels and Growth Rates in Selected OECD 
Countries, 1950-2006 
  (United Sates= 100) 
   1950  1973  1995  2000  2004  2005  2006 
Australia  73.4  75.3  82.1  82.2  80.2  78.5  78.2 
Austria  30.0  62.9  89.2  92.4  89.9  88.2  89.1 
Belgium  49.1  79.7  105.2  102.6  97.5  95.3  95.7 
Canada  81.0  88.5  85.5  83.2  78.2  78.5  78.1 
Denmark  56.5  74.6  97.3  91.8  86.0  85.6  85.9 
Finland  33.9  54.5  80.0  81.8  79.7  79.9  81.7 
France  42.1  73.9  104.9  104.1  100.5  100.1  100.1 
All Germany  -  -  88.2  87.0  82.4  82.0  82.5 
West Germany  36.7  75.4  108.3  -  -  -  - 
Ireland  29.0  44.3  79.8  96.7  99.2  98.7  98.1 
Italy  42.9  75.9  99.4  93.2  83.3  82.2  81.2 
Japan  18.3  51.3  74.0  71.9  70.2  71.0  71.7 
Luxembourg  66.7  84.7  106.6  107.2  100.4  100.7  102.4 
Netherlands  56.8  84.6  98.9  96.4  91.5  90.5  91.1 
New Zealand
1  92.0  67.6  64.5  61.8  58.4  57.4  56.3 
Norway  51.2  73.8  114.0  114.2  113.4  113.0  111.1 
Portugal  18.1  43.3  51.5  54.4  49.3  48.8  48.3 
South Korea
2  17.8  17.0  38.4  41.2  43.3  43.6  44.6 
Spain  21.2  44.5  80.1  71.1  63.4  61.9  60.7 
Sweden  57.4  80.6  84.5  85.3  84.9  85.2  86.4 
Switzerland  73.1  88.7  84.0  81.0  76.2  76.2  76.9 
United Kingdom  61.9  66.0  86.6  86.4  84.8  84.2  84.4 



















1. Data for New Zealand are available for 1956 onwards only. The relative level shown for 1950 is 
actually for 1956, the first year for which data are available for both New Zealand and the United States. 
The growth rate shown for the 1950-73 period is actually for 1956-73. 
2. Data for South Korea are available for 1963 onwards only. The relative level shown for 1950 is 
actually for 1963, the first year for which data are available for both South Korea and the United States. 
The growth rate shown for the 1950-1973 period is actually for 1963-73. 
3. The average excludes the United States for relative levels but includes it for growth rates. For 1950 and 
1973 and the 1950-73 and 1973-1995 periods, West Germany is included and All Germany is not 
included. For 1995, 2000 and 2006 and the 1995-2000, 2000-2006 and 1973-2006 periods, All Germany 
is included and West Germany is not included.  
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Chart 7: Output per Hour Growth Rates in Selected OECD 
Countries, 1973-2006 per cent
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy 






































Chart 8: Canada's Ranking among OECD Countries in terms of 
Output per Hour
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, February 
2007,  http://www.ggdc.net.  
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The causes of the fall-off in labour productivity growth in Canada after 2000 are 
still poorly understood. Possible explanations include measurement problems; weak 
productivity growth in resources industries exploiting poorer quality resources such as 
the oil sands; weak ICT investment; a failure to exploit advanced technologies; and weak 
wage growth leading to a slower rate of substitution of capital for labour (Rao, Sharpe 
and Smith, 2005).  
 
This inability of productivity analysts to provide a definitive account of the 
reasons for our poor productivity growth makes the development of policies to reverse 
this situation more difficult. If we knew what was wrong, we could take action to rectify 
the problem. But we do know that technological change and investment are fundamental 
drivers of productivity growth. Thus policies that focus in these two areas can be 
expected to have a positive impact on productivity growth.  
 
  This brief overview of Canada’s labour productivity performance from an 
historical and international perspective speaks for itself.
13 Canada’s productivity growth 
rate is sub-par and we are falling further and further behind other OECD countries. 
Reviving productivity growth is indeed the biggest and most important economic 
challenge facing this country. Improved public policy aimed at fostering productivity can 
contribute to this revival.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Space limitations prevent a more detailed analysis of Canada’s productivity developments, including 
discussion of capital and total factor productivity trends, productivity trends by industry and productivity 
trends by province.  See the CSLS productivity data base (www.csls.ca/data) for total economy estimates of 
labour, capital, and total factor productivity estimates by province for the 1987-2006 period and estimates 
for Canada of labour, capital, and total factor productivity by major industry for the 1987-2006 period   23 
 
II. Why Productivity is a Tough Sell 
 
  There is an elite consensus in Canada that productivity is very important, but few 
governments or political parties directly address or talk about the productivity issue.
14 
Indeed, politicians often avoid the P word in public pronouncements, preferring 
euphemisms such as prosperity and innovation (Gardiner, 2005). This behaviour in a way 
is understandable because politicians know that productivity does not poll well or 
resonate as an issue for Canadians.  
 
  This part of the paper will explore why the general public appears allergic to 
productivity discourse, arguing that this situation largely reflects misconceptions of what 
productivity is all about.  
 
A. Productivity myths and misconceptions 
 
  In a nutshell, public distrust or ambiguity about productivity stems largely from a 
number of misconceptions and a lack of knowledge about what productivity is and how it 
works. These misconceptions are dissected below.  
 
  People associate productivity increases with working longer hours. A person who 
works longer hours may indeed produce more than someone working fewer hours, and 
hence may be considered more productive on a worker basis. But the relevant metric for 
productivity measurement is output per hour, not per person. Working longer hours does 
not represent an advance in productivity in this sense. 
 
Exhortations by employers to improve productivity are sometimes seen by 
workers as a way to trick them into working faster and harder. It is true that greater 
worker intensity is a potential source of productivity growth, although its sustainability 
can be questioned. But few advocate this measure as a means to increase productivity. It 
is widely recognized that the key for productivity growth is to “work smarter, not 
harder.” 
 
  Many also fear that higher productivity at the industry or firm level translates into 
layoffs. Striving for productivity advance just means that one is working oneself out of a 
job. This can be true in an industry or firm characterized by strong productivity gains and 
limited potential for increases in demand for output. An example is agriculture where 
productivity has soared and employment plummeted over the last half century. But at the 
total economy level, there is no long-run negative relationship between productivity and 
employment. Productivity growth increases potential real income, which in turn increases 
demand, resulting in employment opportunities in new industries. There is therefore no 
reason why productivity growth should have negative long-run consequences for total 
employment. Indeed, there is reason to believe that aggregate productivity growth will 
                                                 
14 See Drummond (2006) for a discussion on what explains the lack of influence of economists on the 
productivity agenda.   24 
actually drive increases in aggregate employment – as long as total hours worked 
increase with higher real wages (positively sloped labour supply curve).
15 Individual 
workers are naturally concerned about the effects of productivity on their jobs, but they 
typically do not think about employment opportunities that are created by rising 
aggregate productivity growth. 
 
  Given that Canadians have already achieved a high standard of living relative to 
other countries, some feel that productivity gains may be less important than they once 
were, particularly if they involve any significant short-term sacrifice or opportunity cost. 
According to this view, higher productivity and income does not lead to greater happiness 
so why bother extend effort to achieve it when there is so much else in life. It is of course 
true that productivity growth does not guarantee happiness. But productivity does lead to 
greater income and this income can in principle be used to raise economic well-being, at 
least as measured objectively if not subjectively. Increased income arising from higher 
productivity can be used by households for private consumption or by governments to 
fund public services, or to provide income support for the disadvantaged. More 
importantly, the resources needed to effectuate more rapid productivity growth through 
better public policy need not be great.   
 
  Productivity growth is of course associated with economic growth and economic 
growth is often associated with environmental degradation and climate change. 
According to certain environmentalists, the consequence of raising productivity and 
income is more spending, which means, for example, more and bigger cars and hence 
more greenhouse gas emissions. But it is not inevitable that increased production and 
consumption must harm the environment. With the appropriate tax and regulatory 
regimes, any negative environmental effects from productivity and economic growth can 
be minimized. Indeed, rich countries are better positioned to take the steps needed to 
preserve the environment than poor countries. Productivity growth, which transforms 
poor countries into rich countries, can therefore potentially be more a part of the solution 
to environmental degradation than a cause of this degradation.  
 
  These myths and misconceptions about productivity can pose a serious barrier to 
the development of effective policies to improve productivity. If the public feels that 
productivity advance is not in its interest or not important, or does not understand what 
productivity is and why it is important, government will have little incentive from a 
political perspective to pursue the issue.   
 
  In addition to the myths outlined above, there is also a current reality that 
contributes to making productivity a tough sell. Workers are encouraged to strive for 
productivity advance on the premise that their real wages will rise in tandem with 
productivity growth. This has indeed been the historical experience in Canada. But in 
recent years, median wages have advanced at a pace well below that of productivity 
gains. This decoupling or bifurcation of productivity and median wage growth reflects 
the increased share of the non-wage components of national income such as profits in 
national income, and increased inequality in labour income fuelled by very strong gains 
                                                 
15 I thank Chris Ragan for this point.    25 
in labour compensation for those, such as CEOs, in the top income brackets. If average 
workers benefit little from productivity growth, why should they care about productivity 
gains? If productivity is to resonate as an issue of importance with the overall population, 
productivity gains must be equitably distributed. Productivity growth with equity must be 
clarion call to build broad-based support for a productivity agenda.  
 
  In an ideal world, government should strive to educate the public about the 
importance of productivity, to convince the public to see productivity as an opportunity 
and not a threat. But this is a long-term project. In the short-to-medium term, government 
can still do much to improve productivity by highlighting policies to foster innovation, 
investment, and human capital. These drivers of productivity have much better press than 
productivity itself and actions to address problems or weaknesses in these areas will be 
perceived more positively by the public. 
   
B. “There is More to Life Than Productivity”  
 
  The bottom line for Canadians should be better quality of life, measured in both 
objective and subjective terms. The economic dimensions of quality of life are but one 
aspect of our overall well-being. We should not pursue productivity and wealth creation 
objectives to the detriment of other aspects of our existence, especially since we are 
already a very rich country.
16 Fortunately, there appears to be no irreconcilable tradeoffs 
between the pursuit of higher productivity and hence a higher material standard of living, 
and the pursuit of other aspects of well-being, such as environmental quality. 
 
  Heath (2002) provides a critique of productivity as a social priority, pointing out 
that the existence of certain types of goods in scarce supply, such as positional and status 
goods (e.g. houses in desirable locations), means that no amount of productivity growth 
can make them available for the general population. Many of his criticisms are valid. 
Indeed, one must closely assess the relative benefits of allocating scarce resources to 
programs and policies designed to enhance productivity compared to programs and 
policies to achieve other societal goals. Programs and policies to boost productivity may 
not have the highest return for society.  
 
  But many measures that can be taken to foster productivity are related to changes 
in policy regimes and the government costs associated with such policies are minimal. It 
is from this perspective that productivity should be a social priority. Any free lunches that 
can be obtained through more intelligent public policy should be sought. 
  
  As shown earlier in the paper, economic growth and living standards, defined as 
GDP per capita, are largely driven by productivity growth. To be sure, increases in the 
employment rate reflecting lower unemployment and higher labour force participation 
can contribute to growth in living standards, as can improvements in the terms of trade. 
But increases in these sources of living standards growth are not sustainable. This means 
                                                 
16 Graves and Jenkins (2002) find through public opinion surveys on attitudes to productivity that 
Canadians wish to balance productivity/living standard objectives with quality of life objectives.   26 
that the only sustainable way to increase living standards in the long run is through 
productivity growth. 
 
  With the retirement of the baby boom cohorts in coming years, net labour force 
and employment growth in Canada will vanish and all economic growth and GDP per 
capita growth will come from productivity growth (Tables 1 and 2 and Charts 1 and 2). 
Strong productivity growth is key to the financing of higher health and pension costs 
associated with the growing proportion of the population 65 and over. Indeed, if labour 
productivity growth equals or exceeds 2.0 per cent per year over the next 50 years, any 
financial burden arising from the aging baby boom cohorts becomes much easier to 
manage. Real incomes will be significantly higher, generating greater tax revenues to pay 
for additional health and pension costs for seniors.
17 On the other hand, with productivity 
growth significantly lower than this rate of growth, sustainability problems for social 
programs may emerge. In short, the message that Canadians must hear is that 
productivity growth is vital to their economic destiny.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The long-term labour productivity base case assumption (real-wage differential assumption) used by the 
Chief Actuary of Canada for the Canada Pension Plan is 1.2 per cent per year, with the pessimistic high-
cost case 0.5 per cent and the optimistic low-cost case 2.0 per cent. With the higher productivity growth, 
the future financial position of the CPP is much improved. In 2050, the ratio of CPP assets to expenditures 
is 9.4 compared to 6.3 in the base case scenario. In 2075, the ratio is 13.7 compared to 6.9 in the base case. 
See Office of the Chief Actuary (2004:Table 71) and Sharpe (2006a).    27 
 
III. Policies to Improve Productivity in Canada 
 
  This section of the paper lays out three specific public policies to improve 
productivity in Canada. As noted earlier, the three policies are: foster the diffusion of 
best-practice technologies; remove the provincial sales tax on purchases of machinery 
and equipment; and promote interprovincial movement of workers improving labour 
market information, removing professional barriers to labour mobility, and establishing a 
tax credit for interprovincial job search. Before examining these three policies, it is useful 
to review some general principles for the application of productivity policy.  
 
A. General Principles for Productivity Policy 
 
As already noted, productivity is determined, either directly or indirectly, by 
many factors, including the education and health of the workforce, all types of 
investment, and technological change, among others. This means that many, if not most, 
public policies have some link to productivity. Interest groups can often use this 
“productivity hook” to make the case that the particular policies they advocate foster 
productivity growth and hence serve the overall public interest.  
 
  This does not mean that these policies are necessarily bad from the point of view 
of the overall societal interest.  But any argument for a particular policy, such as lower 
taxes or more spending, made by an interest group that is rationalized or justified by the 
productivity impact of the policy should be viewed with suspicion and thoroughly 
evaluated before it is accepted. It can be a very effective strategy for interest groups to 
cloak their policy objectives in the blanket of the general interest of productivity 
improvement, even though narrow interests may be largely served. The general interest or 
benefits principle should be applied in any assessments of policies to improve 
productivity. 
 
  It is the private sector that is directly responsible for the productivity performance 
of the business sector through its decisions affecting innovation, physical capital 
investment and human capital investment. As noted earlier, government of course plays a 
crucial role in setting the framework for these private sector decisions. But in the short to 
medium run there is little government can do to increase business sector productivity as 
changes in framework policies take time to have an impact on productivity. In the long 
run, of course, having the appropriate macro-economic and micro-economic frameworks 
in place is essential if a country is to have a strong productivity performance. 
Consequently, one should have low expectations for any impact of policy on 
productivity, particularly in the short term. One should not expect to see productivity 
improvements in 2007 or even 2008 or 2009 arising from policies put in place to improve 
productivity in 2007. A longer term time perspective is needed for public policy to have a 
significant impact on productivity growth. 
 
  As a general principle, the most important framework policy that the government 
can pursue to foster productivity growth is to ensure a competitive marketplace. There is   28 
much evidence from many countries that competition spurs productivity advance 
(Sharpe, 2006b). A highly instructive example is the air passenger travel industry in 
Europe. The deregulation of this industry lead to the development of a number of low 
cost, high productivity airlines such as Ryanair that have revolutionized air travel. An 
example closer to home is the Canadian wine industry. Because of the lowering of trade 
barriers survival for this industry required an improvement in the quality of its product, a 
challenge which the industry met. In a highly competitive environment, firms must 
invest, innovate, and closely monitor costs to survive, with beneficial effects for 
productivity. Barriers to competition are the enemies of productivity growth. 
 
  Governments in Canada have done much to provide a more conducive economic 
environment for productivity advance in the areas of monetary, fiscal, and trade policy. 
But some segments of our economy are still protected from market forces, with negative 
implications for innovation, investment, and productivity growth. Policies to enhance 
competition may in fact be more important for productivity than policies directly aimed 
at improving productivity.  
 
B. Policy One: More Rapid Diffusion and Adoption of Best Practice Technologies  
 
1) Moving Toward the Frontier and Closing the Technology Gap 
 
  Technological progress is the most important determinant of productivity 
advance. At any given time, only a small number of firms or countries are on the 
technological frontier, defined at the set of technologies that are the most advanced, 
efficient, and cost effective. Other firms or countries can experience very rapid 
productivity growth by adopting these best practice technologies and moving toward the 
technological frontier. Indeed, the rapid growth in Europe and Japan in the immediate 
post-WWII period reflected in large part technological catch-up or convergence to the 
United States, the world technology leader in most fields (Wolff, 2000). 
  
  Canada, too, is playing catch-up relative to the United States. In 2001, Canada’s 
level of labour productivity in the business sector was only 82 per cent of that of the 
United States in 2001 (Rao, Tang and Wang, 2004: Table 2). Twelve out of 27 industries 
had labour productivity relatives below this average figure.
18 The reasons for these large 
industry labour productivity gaps are complex. One factor is that capital intensity (i.e. 
capital per unit of labour) is lower in Canada than in the United States.  
 
  Rao, Tang and Wang (2004: Table 4) indeed report that total capital stock per 
hour worked in the business sector in 2001 was 85 per cent of the US level. The situation 
is much worse for machinery and equipment, which is crucial for productivity advance. 
Sharpe (2004:22) reports that the ratio of machinery and equipment to hours worked in 
                                                 
18 These industries (with the productivity relative in brackets) were: textile and clothing (62 per cent); 
petroleum and coal (61 per cent); plastic and rubber products (77 per cent); fabricated metal (52 per cent); 
machinery and computers (63 per cent); electronic and electrical equipment (44 per cent); furniture (73 per 
cent); miscellaneous manufacturing (56 per cent); utilities (75 per cent); wholesale trade (69 per cent); 
information and cultural industries (60 per cent); and finance, insurance and real estate (55 per cent).      29 
Canada was 55 per cent of that in the United States in 2003. This lower capital intensity 
reflects lower levels of investment. Indeed, machinery and equipment investment in 
Canada as a share of GDP has considerably lagged that in the United States over the last 
half century.  
 
  Investment is the vector through which most technological advances are 
manifested in the workplace. These advances are in effect embodied in new capital 
goods. This weak investment implies that the vintage of the technology in use in Canada 
is on average older and therefore less advanced than in the United States. To the degree 
that Canadian firms in these industries can adopt advanced technologies through 
increased investment, some of the Canada-US labour productivity gap can be closed. 
From this perspective, public policies that foster the diffusion and adoption of best 
practice technologies, largely through investment, have a significant role to play in 
improving Canada’s productivity growth, both in absolute and relative terms. 
 
  Canada produces only a very small share of the world stock of new knowledge.   
In 2004, Canada was responsible for 2.9 per cent of OECD R&D. If the R&D 
expenditure of non-OECD countries is added, Canada’s share of world R&D would be 
even smaller, likely around 2 per cent. This means that if Canadian firms want to be on 
the technology frontier they must make use of technologies developed in other countries 
and hence must be aware of the existence of these technologies.   
 
  Some free market economists argue that public policies to foster the adoption of 
new technologies are not needed because firms already have a huge economic incentive 
to adopt best practice technologies. Early adopters of new technologies can earn excess 
profits. If so, why would firms need additional incentives from government to do what is 
already in their interest?  
 
  The counterargument to this is that certain types of firms, particularly small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs), may face barriers to the adoption of new technologies and 
government policy can assist firms in overcoming these barriers. The acquisition of 
information and adoption of new technologies has a cost, and SMEs may not have the 
different types of resources needed. They may not have the time to keep abreast of new 
technological developments at the world level. They may not have the expertise to 
identify those technological developments that would be potentially appropriate for their 
production processes and to make effective use of these technologies. They also may not 
have the financial resources to purchase the capital goods that embody the technology. A 
case will be made below for government assistance for technology transfer     
   
2) R&D Is Important, But There is More to Innovation than R&D 
 
  The federal government and provincial governments in Canada devote significant 
resources to subsiding the research and development (R&D) activities of the private 
sector, particularly through tax credits. Indeed, the federal scientific research and 
experimental development tax credit in 2007 is projected to cost $2,675 million (Finance 
Canada, 2005). Mackenzie (2005) finds very large subsidies (negative tax rates) for R&D   30 
in Canadian provinces, ranging in 2004 from a low of 40 per cent in Alberta to a high of 
202 per cent in Quebec. Very generous provincial tax credits to R&D explain these large 
subsidies.     
 
To be sure, R&D is important for innovation, particular in certain high tech 
sectors such as communications equipment and aeronautics, and governments must 
contribute to support R&D activities. But in 2002 only 12,272 firms in Canada actually 
reported performing R&D, with 100 firms accounting for 56 per cent of total R&D 
(Statistics Canada, 2006:17). Thus less than 1 per cent of firms perform R&D in Canada. 
If the term “innovation” were reserved for firms that undertook R&D, very few Canadian 
firms would be considered innovative.  
 
However, an innovative firm is more appropriately defined as one which 
introduces new production processes and products. By this criterion, 81 per cent of 
manufacturing firms in Canada can be considered innovative according to the 1999 
Survey of Innovation (Arundel and Mohnen, 2003:58). Thus from the point of view of 
fostering productivity growth, R&D is not relevant for the vast majority of Canadian 
firms. What is relevant is the adoption of best practice technologies. Yet this path to 
productivity improvement receives much less attention than R&D.
19 A distinction 
between innovation in the sense of knowledge creation (invention) and innovation in the 
sense of the adoption of existing technologies (diffusion) is needed.   
 
  Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005:518) point out that economists have not 
appreciated the tradeoff between invention and diffusion as they assume diffusion occurs 
instantaneously or costlessly. Innovators introduce new stand-alone technologies which 
diffuse through the economy in unchanged form. But invention and diffusion are separate 
activities. New technologies must be adapted for particular uses and require supporting 
technologies and facilitating structures.  
 
  Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005:520) point to sunk costs, defined as costs that 
have already been incurred and which cannot be recovered to any significant degree, as a 
barrier to diffusion and argue that this situation may justify public policy intervention. 
According to these authors: 
 
“Sunk costs are important for the development of new products and processes; 
they are equally important for acquiring codifiable knowledge about new 
knowledge, as well as tacit knowledge about how to operate given technologies. 
One major policy implication is that governments can effectively disseminate 
technological knowledge by operating on a scale that makes the sunk costs 
bearable, or even trivial, where they would otherwise be prohibitively high for 
small firms. This is the objective of the Canadian Industrial Research Assistance 
Program (IRAP), which seeks, among other things, to help firms to identify 
existing technologies that are of potential value to them and to assist them in 
adapting these technologies to their specific needs.”  
   
                                                 
19 For an overview of the issue of the diffusion and adoption of advanced technologies, see CSLS (2005).   31 
  Based on the arguments outlined above, a case can be made that there should be a 
rebalancing of the relative efforts that governments in Canada devote to support for 
private sector R&D activities versus the support given for the adoption of best practice 
technologies. To foster technological innovation and productivity growth, it is proposed 
that additional resources be allocated to programs that assist SMEs in the identification 
and adoption/adaptation of new technologies. 
  
  As noted by Richard Lipsey et al., the National Research Council’s Industrial 
Research Assistance Program (NRC-IRAP) is an example of a successful technology 
transfer program. This program provides a range of both technical and business oriented 
advisory services along with potential financial support to growth-oriented Canadian 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. The program is delivered by an extensive integrated 
network of 260 professionals in 90 communities across the country and serves over 
12,000 firms annually. Working directly with these clients, NRC-IRAP supports 
innovative research and development and commercialization of new products and 
services. The IRAP portfolio of services has four main components: technology expertise 
and advisory services; financial assistance for R&D activities; networking; and 
partnerships.
20 All Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's) with under 500 
employees and industrial associations desiring to enhance their technological capability 
are eligible for support. In 2005-06, the budget of IRAP was $216 million, up from $214 
million in 2004-05, and $208 million in 2003-04 (Treasury Board of Canada, 2006). 
In a evaluation of the IRAP in 2002 (NRC, 2002), the NRC’s Policy, Planning 
and Assessment Directorate found that, based on interviews with program participants, 
sales linked to IRAP-assisted innovations were equivalent to 11 times IRAP’s total 
contributions to clients. It concluded that IRAP had been successful in its mission of 
stimulating wealth for Canadians through technological innovation. However, it should 
be noted that no rigorous, independent evaluation of IRAP activities has been undertaken 
in recent years so definitive evidence on IRAP’s cost-benefit ratio is absent.    
Productivity advance in Canada can be fostered in a cost effective manner through 
expansion of existing technology transfer programs such as IRAP, and the creation of 
new programs with similar objectives. Specific initiatives to develop these types of 
program merit serious attention as a means to improve productivity.  
                                                 
20 The key elements of the four components are summarized below, based on information from the IRAP 
website (http://irap-pari.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca). First, the NRC-IRAP Industrial Technology Advisors (ITAs) help 
to identify and address the technical and research needs of SMEs at each stage of the R&D development 
process and the innovation cycle. Second, NRC-IRAP provides non-repayable contributions to Canadian 
SMEs interested in growing by using technology to commercialize services, products and processes in 
Canadian and international markets. NRC-IRAP also provides mentoring support and invests on a cost-
shared basis for research and pre-competitive development technical projects. Third, the NRC-IRAP 
Network brings together the key players in the Canadian Innovation System for the benefit of SMEs. This 
extensive network links entrepreneurs, research and development (R&D) institutions, technology brokers 
and technology transfer centres to those with knowledge and information about local sources of financing. 
Fourth, NRC-IRAP maintains strong partner relationships with organizations at the regional, national and 
international level whose capabilities extend and complement NRC's contributions to the Canadian 
Innovation System.  
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C. Policy Two: Removal of the Provincial Sales Tax on Purchases of Machinery and 
Equipment 
 
  It has long been recognized that investment in machinery and equipment (M&E) 
is a key driver of productivity growth. M&E investment has historically been weak in 
Canada relative to other OECD countries. According to the most recent OECD data, 
Canada in 2004 devoted 6.3 per cent of GDP to M&E, ranking 20
th out of 28 OECD 
countries (Chart 9).This situation hurts our productivity performance. Indeed, Industry 
Canada economists estimate that our lower level of M&E intensity relative to the United 
States accounted for 30.3 percent of the Canada-US labour productivity gap in the 
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Chart 9: Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Machinery and Equipment 
as a Percentage of GDP in Selected OECD Countries, 2004* 
Per cent
Source: OECD (2006) OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, ISBN 92-64-03561-3, P. 44.
Note: Data in 2004 are not available for countries with an asterisk, so the latest year estimates were used.
 
 
  The cost of capital affects investment decisions. Indeed, Ab Iorwerth and 
Danforth (2004), in a survey of the literature on the elasticity of investment with respect 
to the use cost of capital, conclude that there is increasing evidence that lowering the user 
cost of capital would have a significant impact on firm investment and that policy 
initiatives should be focused on permanent changes in the user cost of capital.  
 
  One reason for lower M&E investment in Canada may be the higher cost of 
capital in Canada, as proxied by the marginal effective tax rate (METR) on capital. The 
CD Howe Institute reports that Canada has one of the highest METRs in the world 
(Mintz, 2006). The METR was 36.6 per cent in Canada in 2006, sixth out of 45 countries.   33 
Among OECD countries Canada’s METR was third highest, after that of Germany and 
the United States
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Chart 10: Effective Tax Rate on Capital in Selected OECD 
Countries, 2006 Per cent
Source: Mintz, Jack M.(2006) The 2006 Tax Competitiveness Report: Proposals for Pro-Growth Tax Reform, C.D. Howe Institute 
Commentary 239, P. 12.  
 
  A key reason why our METR is so high is because five provinces (Ontario, 
British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) apply their retail 
or provincial sales tax (PST) to the purchase of capital goods such as machinery and 
equipment, including ICT goods. Because of this tax policy, these five provinces have 
much higher METRs than the other provinces (Chart 11).
22 The highest METR in Canada 
is in Saskatchewan at 38.9 per cent (in 2010), followed by Ontario (37.1 per cent), British 
Columbia (34.4 per cent), Manitoba (33.5 per cent), and Prince Edward Island (30.9 per 
cent).   
 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that the METR has been falling in Canada in recent years, in contrast to an increase 
in the United States. Consequently, our past poor M&E investment performance relative to the United 
States likely reflected the METR gap. But the higher US METR in 2006 means that this variable is not a 
factor that dampens investment in Canada relative to the United States, although it may dampen investment 
relative to countries with a lower METR.   
22 Finance Canada estimates that in 2010 for all sectors excluding resources, financial services and R&D 
assets, sales tax net of provincial tax credits will account for 12.4 percentage points of the provincial 
METR in Prince Edward Island, Ontario 8.8 points, Saskatchewan 8.6 points, British Columbia 7.7 points, 
Manitoba 7.1 points and Quebec 0.2 points. At the national level, sales tax net of provincial sales tax 
credits accounted for 5.4 per cent of the estimated METR of 32.5 points, that is one sixth. The sales tax rate 
is projected to be 7 per cent in Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Manitoba, 8 per cent in Ontario, and 
10.0 per cent in Prince Edward Island.   34 
In the other five provinces, the PST has been merged with the GST (i.e. the 
Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland), or 
replaced with a value added tax (Quebec), or never existed (Alberta). Chart 11 shows that 
if there were no PST on the purchase of capital goods, the METRs in Canada in 2010 
would be approximately 5 percentage points lower.   
 
  Tax policy experts across the political spectrum are unanimous that the current 
PST regime which taxes the purchase of new capital equipment is extremely bad policy, 
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Chart 11: METRs by province or territory in 2010
Provincial Sales tax
Provincial capital tax
Provincial/territorial corporate income tax
Federal Corporate Income tax
Per cent
Source: Tax expenditures and Evalutations 2005, Finances Canada.             **Negative due to the Atlantic Investment Iax Credit  
 
The effect of such a tax is to increase the price of capital relative to the price of 
labour, giving firms less incentive to substitute capital for labour and hence leading to 
slower growth in the capital-labour ratio or capital intensity. Since capital intensity 
growth is a key driver of labour productivity, the latter suffers.  If Canada were a labour 
surplus country, there might be some justification for such a policy on the basis of 
fostering employment, at least in the short to medium term.
23 But with the unemployment 
rate at around 6 per cent, Canada should be encouraging substitution of capital for labour.   
 
Evidence of the positive effect of the removal of the PST on capital investment 
comes from work by Michael Smart and Richard Bird (2006) and Smart (2007). They 
find that the growth in investment per capita has been more rapid in the HST provinces 
that do not tax capital inputs than in PST provinces that impose such a tax. In an 
                                                 
23 It is however not clear that the long-run health of an economy is promoted by subsidizing employment 
and taxing capital goods.    35 
econometric analysis, they find that the impact of HST reform on M&E investment is 
positive and statistically significant. 
 
  The inefficiency resulting from the PST on capital goods has been illustrated in a 
study by Baylor and Beausejour (2004) based on a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model of the Canadian economy. The study found that the marginal cost of a 
dollar of revenue raised by provincial governments
24 through sales taxes on capital is 
$2.30, compared to $1.40 for corporate income taxes and $1.13 for consumption taxes 
like the GST/HST. 
 
  A case can thus be made that equal cuts to the different components of the METR 
do not in fact have the same impact on investment and that cuts to the PST have a greater 
incremental effect than cuts to the corporate income tax. This is because the cuts to the 
PST reduce the cost of capital goods to firms, directly impacting the price of capital 
goods. This induces investment by making it more profitable through lowering costs. 
Cuts to corporate income taxes increase after-tax profits, but have no effect on the price 
of capital goods. There is also no guarantee that any ex post increase in after-tax profits 
will be invested. An additional reason to reduce the METR through removal of the PST 
rather than by corporate income tax (CIT) cuts is that the current CIT rates ensure at least 
some of resource sector economic rents arising from higher commodity prices flow to 
governments as corporate taxes.  
 
  It should also be noted that the PST affects short-lived assets such as information 
and communications technology investment goods much more than long-lived assets 
such as structures since the former turn over, and hence are taxed, more frequently than 
the latter. ICT investment is particularly important for productivity growth.    
  
The federal government has long recognized the problems associated with the 
PST on capital goods, particularly in Ontario and British Columbia as these provinces are 
responsible for the lion’s share of the 5 percentage point national gap between the METR 
with and without the PST. 
 
The federal government would like to see the PST harmonized with the GST, as 
happened with the establishment of the Harmonized Sales Tax in Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick. One of the key reason for such a policy is removal of the 
PST from capital goods. Because of its input tax credit, the GST does not constitute a tax 
on capital goods like the PST. But provinces are reluctant to drop the PST on capital 
goods. For such a measure to be revenue neutral, provincial governments would have to 
increase taxes on consumer goods, a politically unpopular move.  
 
 A possible resolution to this situation lies in the federal government providing 
financial assistance to the PST provinces to harmonize their PST with the GST. Such 
assistance was offered to the three Atlantic provinces in the early 1990s to encourage 
                                                 
24 The marginal cost of a dollar of revenue is the cost of raising an additional dollar of revenue, which 
includes the direct cost (the dollar of revenue actually raised) plus any additional welfare costs resulting 
from the change in the tax structure.    36 
harmonization. Such assistance could take different forms. For example, the federal 
government could offer PST provinces some of the fiscal room that will be created by the 
planned second 1 percentage point reduction in the GST rate. Kesselman (2006) provides 
some detailed suggestions along this line. This is the ideal time for such an initiative 
given the sound fiscal situation of the federal government. 
 
D. Policy Three: Promotion of the Geographical Migration of Workers 
 
1) Provincial productivity and interprovincial mobility in Canada 
 
  In addition to the three fundamental drivers (technological progress, investment 
and human capital), the reallocation of factors of production from low productivity level 
uses to high productivity level uses contributes significantly to aggregate productivity 
growth. This reallocation can take place between firms, across industries, across 
occupations, and across space. 
   
There are significant differences in labour productivity levels among Canadian 
provinces, reflecting differences in resource endowments, industrial structure, human 
capital, and demand conditions. In 2006, current dollar GDP per worker ranged from a 
high of $125,938 in Alberta to a low of $63,149 in Prince Edward Island, a difference of 
2 to 1 (Summary Table 4). These productivity differences result in large wage 
differences, although the wage differential is not as drastic (Chart 12). 
 
Summary Table 4: GDP per Worker in Current Dollars by 
Province, 1991-2006 
   1991  1996  2001  2006 
Canada  53,305  62,353  74,136  87,313 
Newfoundland  46,834  55,557  69,573  115,424 
P.E.I.  42,228  47,929  53,947  63,149 
Nova Scotia  46,374  51,770  62,401  72,354 
New Brunswick  46,230  54,422  62,660  70,965 
Quebec  50,303  57,680  67,329  75,466 
Ontario  56,426  65,447  76,559  85,678 
Manitoba  47,413  54,956  63,426  76,247 
Saskatchewan  47,194  63,363  71,968  91,642 
Alberta  56,752  70,197  92,755  125,938 
British Columbia  51,885  59,934  69,481  81,850 
 
Source: Table 4 
 
This means that if a worker moves from a low-productivity province such as 
Prince Edward Island to a high productivity province such as Alberta, and if the worker 
leaves behind the average productivity of the out-province and assumes the average 
productivity of the in-province, through a composition effect, the national productivity 
level will be boosted. Consequently, interprovincial migration contributes to aggregate   37 
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Chart 12: Total Compensation per Worker by Province, 2005




  According to Statistics Canada, there were 370,791 persons who moved between 
provinces in Canada in 2006 (Summary Table 5). This is equivalent to 1.14 per cent of 
the population. The incidence of interprovincial migration in Canada has increased 46 per 
cent since 2003 when it was 0.78 per cent (Chart 13). This is not surprisingly given the 
attention given to interprovincial migration by the media in recent years.  
 
  From a long term perspective, however, the rate of interprovincal mobility has 
been falling as the rate was 1.78 per cent in 1972. Canadian workers now appear to be 
less willing to seek economic opportunities in other provinces than they were three 
decades ago. The much greater importance of dual-earner families reflecting increased 
female labour force participation is one factor that appears to have reduced geographical 
mobility. The aging of the population has also contributed somewhat.
25   
 
  In addition to a falling incidence of labour mobility, Canada’s interprovincial 
migration rate is well below that of the United States (Chart 14), The incidence of inter-
state migration on the United States in 2005 was 2.60 per cent, almost three times the 
Canadian rate (Sharpe, 2007). The 50 states are organized into nine divisions so the inter-
                                                 
25 While older workers have lower mobility rates than younger workers (Table 7), the aging of the labour 
force accounts for only about one eighth of this downward trend. If the 1972 age structure had prevailed in 
2006, the incidence rate would have been only 12 per cent higher. 
   38 
division migration rate is likely a more relevant comparison between mobility in the two 
countries because divisions are much closer in size to provinces than states. This rate was 
1.41 per cent in 2005, 48 per cent above the Canadian rate. Even the mobility rate 
between the four US regions, at 1.08 per cent, was 14 per cent above the mobility rate for 
Canada’s ten provinces. It would thus appear that workers in the United States are 
significantly more mobile than their counterparts in Canada. This geographical mobility 
can be considered a source of labour market flexibility and dynamism and may contribute 
somewhat to the lower US unemployment rate.    
 
Summary Table 5: Total Gross Migration and Total Net Migration, 1987-2005 
(persons) 
   Total Gross 
Migration 
As a % of the 
Total Population 
Total Net Migration 
to Positive Balance 
Provinces 
As a % of the 
Total Population 
1987  306,410  1.16  57,126  0.22 
1988  311,501  1.17  40,639  0.15 
1989  335,707  1.23  40,592  0.15 
1990  320,900  1.16  50,066  0.18 
1991  304,105  1.09  40,831  0.15 
1992  297,868  1.05  40,511  0.14 
1993  273,145  0.96  37,336  0.13 
1994  276,222  0.96  34,532  0.12 
1995  276,100  0.95  27,751  0.10 
1996  274,115  0.93  32,428  0.11 
1997  280,719  0.94  39,770  0.13 
1998  286,380  0.95  49,833  0.17 
1999  266,690  0.88  38,132  0.13 
2000  280,645  0.92  46,619  0.15 
2001  271,371  0.88  34,906  0.11 
2002  271,738  0.87  22,622  0.07 
2003  247,230  0.78  14,835  0.05 
2004  260,532  0.82  26,216  0.08 
2005  304,991  0.95  54,404  0.17 
2006  370,791  1.14  69,740  0.21 
 
1987- 2006  290,858  0.99  39,944  0.14 
 
Source: Table 6 
 
2) Productivity gains from geographical mobility  
 
  For many reasons, estimation of the productivity gains from geographic mobility 
is extremely complex. A full discussion of the issue is well beyond the scope of this 
paper. Using two very crude methodologies, this paper does present two estimates of the 
output and productivity gains arising from interprovincial migration in Canada.
26  The 
                                                 
26 The gains arising from intraprovincial migration are ignored. Intraprovincial migration in large provinces 
such as Ontario and Quebec is very significant. The 2001 census estimates that the rate of one-year   39 
purpose of these estimates is to show that migration does contribute to productivity 
growth. The first methodology uses the impact of interprovincial migration on earnings to 




















Source:  Interprovincial migration from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 051-0019. Total Canadian population 
from Annual Statistics Canada Estimates, CANSIM Table 051-0045.
Chart 13: Total Number of Interprovincial Migrants as a Percentage 
of Total Canadian Population, 1987-2006 (per cent)
Gross migration as a % of 
the Total Population
Net migration as a % of 
the Total Population
 
   
Persons migrate largely for economic reasons, so not surprisingly migrants 
experience larger gains in earnings than non-migrants. Using the tax data from the 
Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD), Ross Finnie found that interprovincial 
migrants in Canada experienced a 9.4 per cent increase in earnings over a two-year 
period, compared to 4.8 per cent for stayers and 0.8 per cent for others (Finnie, 




                                                                                                                                                 
intraprovincial migration rate, defined as migration between census divisions (Ontario has 47) in Canada 
was 2.76 per cent, more than three times the interprovincial migration rate of 0.88 per cent. 
27 An earlier study by Lin (1995) on the economic returns to mobility also found that moving to another 
province pays off greatly. On average, male migrants' nominal earnings from paid employment increased 
by $7,682, while those of non-migrants increased by only $2,162, a net earnings return to mobility of 
$5,520 or nearly 26 percent of male migrants' pre-move earnings. The earnings return to female mobility 
was a bit smaller than that of males in magnitude, but even higher (nearly 45 percent) when expressed as a 
percentage of female migrants' pre-move earnings. 
   40 
  According to the 2001 census, 82 per cent of interprovincial migrants were of 
working age (15 and over) and the employment rate of working age migrants was 66 per 
cent. This implies that of the 370,791 migrants in 2006, 201 thousands were employed in 
the destination province. In 2006, total employment in Canada was 16,484 thousand so 
interprovincial migrants represented 1.22 per cent of this total. Labour income, expressed 
in current prices, was $737 billion, 53 per cent of GDP. Assuming that the labour income 
of migrants is the same as the average worker, labour income for interprovincial migrants 
was $9.0 billion. If wages were 4.6 per cent higher for this group due to interprovincial 
migration, this gain was $413 million in labour income and $779 million in GDP, the 
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Chart 14: Comparison of One-Year Geographic Labour Mobility in 
Canada and the United States, 2005
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  The second methodology used to estimate the impact of interprovincial migration 
on productivity gives larger results as it takes a broader approach to the concept of 
productivity, a social productivity perspective. It includes the benefits for the economy 
from persons going from non-employment to employment through migration.  
 
Sharpe, Arsenault and Ershov (2007) quantify changes in aggregate output and 
labour productivity brought about by the interprovincial migration of workers. Total 
output gains are the result of two separate effects, the effect of employment gains as a 
result of interprovincial migration and the effect of the re-allocation of workers between 
                                                 
28 This calculation of course ignores the gains from intraprovincial migration, which as noted is three times 
as important as interprovincial migration. Therefore the total impact on GDP of both types of migration 
may be closer to $240 million 
   41 
jobs with different productivity levels. The former effect occurs when people move from 
provinces with lower employment rates to provinces with higher employment rates. This 
results in some persons who were unemployed or out of the labour force in the origin 
province gaining employment in the destination province and creating output gains. The 
latter is caused by already employed workers moving from provinces with low average 
productivity levels to provinces with high average productivity levels. Assuming that 
workers have, on average, the average productivity level of their province of residence, 
they will become more productive as a result of migrating. Total national output will 
increase by the difference in average productivity between high and low productivity 
provinces for every worker who moves, also increasing aggregate labour productivity.
29 
 
The study found that in 2006 the total change in nominal output as a result of 
interprovincial migration was $1,966.4 million, equivalent to 0.137 per cent of GDP. 
About 70 per cent of the gains ($1,387 million equivalent to 0.097 per cent of GDP
30) 
were from the reallocation of workers and 30 per cent ($579 million equivalent to 0.04 
per cent of GDP) from employment increases.
31 
 
It should be noted that the contribution of interprovincial migration to nominal 
output in 2006 at 0.137 per cent of GDP was over three times the 0.04 average 
contribution for the 1987-2006 period. This is explained by three factors: the very large 
net interprovincial migration to Alberta in 2006 (62,291 persons); the widening gap in 
nominal labour productivity levels between provinces with positive net migration and 
those with negative net migration, due to rising energy prices; and the widening gap in 
employment rates between provinces with positive net migration and those with negative 
net migration.  
 
  The gains to aggregate productivity from interprovincial migration based on the 
methodologies discussed above are not huge, although they are likely underestimated for 
a number of reasons, including the fact that migrants self-select and likely have non-
                                                 
29 In more concrete terms, gains in output due to employment changes are equal to the product of the 
number of new jobs gained as a result of migration between provinces with different employment rates 
(provinces with net gains will have higher employment rates) and the average productivity level of 
provinces with net migration gains. The gains in output due to re-allocation are equal to the difference in 
average productivity between provinces with net migration gains and provinces with net migration losses, 
multiplied by the number of workers who leave provinces with net migration losses. Total gains in output 
due to interprovincial migration are equal to the sum of the two factors. Many assumptions had to be made 
concerning the migrants in order to quantify the effects of migration on output. It was assumed that the 
migrating workers have had, on average, the average productivity of their province and that when they 
moved to a new province, they obtained jobs with the average productivity of the new province. In 
addition, it was assumed that migrants had the demographic structure of their province of origin. The 
results obviously depend on the validity of the assumptions. The CSLS is currently examining 
interprovincial migration data from the SLID and the census to assess the realism of these assumptions.  
30 This is double the 0.05 per cent of GDP contribution found through the productivity impact of 
interprovincial migration as measured by the effect on wages.  
31 Measured in 1997 dollars, the contribution of interprovincial migration to output was about half the size, 
at 0.074 per cent of GDP (883 million), with 0.041 per cent  (485 million) from reallocation of workers and 
0.033 per cent ($398 million) from employment increases (Sharpe, Arsenault and Ershov, 2007). The large 
increase in commodity prices accounts for the difference.    42 
observable characteristics such as drive that distinguish them from non-migrants and that 
lead them to have above average productivity.
32 The inclusion of intraprovincial 
migration, nearly three times that of interprovincial migration, would have also greatly 
increased the gains to aggregate productivity from migration. 
 
  Importantly, however, the estimated annual output gains from migration are 
positive and cumulate over time. For example, the gains to nominal output from the level 
effects of interprovincial migration from 1987 to 2006 cumulate to 0.75 per cent of GDP, 
or over $11 billion in 20006 dollars, a significant number.
33 Migration should be 
recognized as a contributor to aggregate productivity growth.   
 
3) Policies to Foster Internal Migration in Canada  
 
  Trends in interprovincial and intraprovincial migration are largely determined by 
market forces. Differences in employment opportunities, as evidenced by differentials in 
unemployment rates and labour compensation between provinces and regions, are the 
main drivers of net internal migration in Canada. In most instances, government policies 
do not directly promote migration. Indeed, it is probably accurate to say that the net effect 
of government policies is to reduce migration. For example, the federal employment 
insurance program, which is more generous in high unemployment than in low 
unemployment regions, reduces the incentive for the unemployed to leave high 
unemployment regions, although this disincentive effect may not be particularly large.
34 
Provincial governments, which invest heavily in the human capital of their population, 
naturally prefer to see their residents find employment in the province, and establish 
policies and programs to achieve this objective. 
 
  Nevertheless, from the pan-Canadian point of view of the federal government, 
policies that promote interprovincial migration by reducing barriers to mobility
35 foster 
the national economic interests through their positive impact on output and productivity. 
One current initiative that does promote interprovincial mobility is the labour market 
information (LMI) programs run by Human Resources and Social Development Canada. 
These programs, such as the National Job Bank and Job Futures, provide information on 
job vacancies and career and employment opportunities to all Canadians.  
 
One concrete suggestion would be the creation of an independent agency for the 
development and dissemination of LMI along the lines of the Canadian Institute for 
Health Information (CIHI). Both federal and provincial government play a role in the 
                                                 
32 On the other hand, the gains may be overestimated to the degree that the employment rate and the labour 
productivity level of interprovincial out-migrants and in-migrants differs from the average of the province. 
33 The cumulative gains to real GDP (1997 dollars) from interprovincial migration over the 1987-2006 
period were 0.66 per cent of GDP, or $6.2 billion 1997 dollars.  
34 Lin (1995) finds that receipt of unemployment insurance, on average, does not statistically significantly 
increase the probability of interprovincial labour mobility, although he does note that specific aspects of the 
UI system may positively affect mobility. Duclos (2007) in this volume proposes changes to EI that would 
eliminate the negative effect on mobility.  
35 See Gomez and Gunderson (2007) for an overview of the barriers to interprovincal labour mobility in 
Canada.   43 
LMI area, but their efforts are often uncoordinated and duplicative. A non-governmental 
agency funded by both levels of government could potentially invigorate the LMI field 
and make Canadians more aware of employment opportunities throughout the country.  
 
The federal government is also attempting to reduce barriers to labour mobility in 
provincially licensed professions through the Agreement on Internal Trade secretariat. 
Macmillan and Grady (2007) report that remaining interprovincial barriers related to 
licensing are limited. But measures to eliminate these remaining barriers to mobility 
would still have an economic payoff. 
 
  In terms of new policies to foster interprovincial mobility, this paper also 
proposes that the federal government establish a tax credit for expenses associated with 
job search in other provinces. Moving expenses are currently deductible from income. 
But the expenses associated with initial job search, such as travel and accommodation 
expenses, are currently not covered. Their coverage would reduce the after-tax cost of 
interprovincial job search and hence provide an additional fiscal incentive for workers to 
seek better employment opportunities in other provinces. 
 
  A risk associated with such a mobility tax credit is that it might encourage “game 
playing.” Persons may claim a deduction for job search costs even though they were not 
engaged in genuine job search. Proof of job search, such as submission of a form signed 
by employers approached, might be required for this deduction. 
  
  The actual costs of such a program would be small. According to Finance Canada 
tax expenditure estimates (Finance Canada, 2005), the cost of the moving expense 
deduction to the federal treasury was $88 million in 2002 and projected to rise to $100 
million in 2007. As this number includes the cost of moving possessions and family 
members and applies to both interprovincial and intraprovincial moves, the cost of a 
deduction for interprovincial job search expenses for one family member would be much 
less. A ballpark estimate of the cost of the initiative might be in the range of $15 to $25 
million.       
   
  In addition to the positive (although probably minor) effect at the margin on the 
decision of Canadians to engage in interprovincial job search, another advantage of the 
proposal is to highlight the role of interprovincial mobility for a dynamic labour market. 
Such a tax credit would be a concrete manifestation of the importance that the federal 
government attaches to workers seeking employment opportunities where they arise 
throughout the country.        




  This paper has made the case that productivity is our economic destiny and that 
Canada’s dismal productivity performance, both from a historical and international 
perspective, therefore represents our biggest economic challenge. It then put forward 
three specific policies to improve Canada’s productivity performance: foster the diffusion 
of best-practice technologies; remove the provincial sales tax on purchases of machinery 
and equipment; and promote interprovincial movement of workers by improving labour 
market information, removing professional barriers to labour mobility, and establishing a 
tax credit for interprovincial job search. The short-term costs of these policies would be 
greatly outweighed by the long-term benefits. 
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